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TRADING MECHANISMS, SPECULATIVE BEHAVIOR OF
INVESTORS, AND THE VOLATILITY OF PRICES:
SPOT VERSUS FUTURES
ABSTRACT
This paper compares the volatility of spot prices (dealership
market) with that of futures prices (auction market) to test the
Implications of different trading mechanisms for the volatility of
prices. First, a natural estimator of the volatility is used. Using
the intraday data of the major Market Index and Its futures prices, we
show that the volatility of opening prices is higher than that of
closing prices not only in the spot market but in the futures market,
and that the intraday volatility patterns are U-shaped in both markets.
Of particular interest is that futures prices do not appear to be as
volatile as spot prices when the natural estimator of volatility is
used, to the contrary of the conventional wisdom. We argue that the
different volatility patterns during the day are not necessarily due
to the different trading mechanisms, auction market versus dealership
market. Instead, after developing a simple theoretical model of spe-
culative prices, we show that at least part of the different vola-
tility patterns during the day may be attributable to speculative
behavior of investors based on heterogeneous information. In addition,
we further investigate the volatilities of spot and futures prices
using a temporal estimator of price volatility as an alternative to
the natural estimator. Based on the temporal estimator, we cannot
find any systematic pattern of volatilities during the day in both
spot and futures markets, and that futures prices appear to be more
volatile than spot prices. Thus, we argue that futures prices may be
said to be more volatile than spot prices in terms of how quickly the
price moves beyond a given unit price level, but not in terms of how
much the price changes during a given unit time interval. Some policy
implications are also discussed.

TRADING MECHANISMS, SPECULATIVE BEHAVIOR OF
INVESTORS, AND THE VOLATILITY OF PRICES:
SPOT VERSUS FUTURES
I. Introduction
One of the important factors that affect the volatility of
security prices may be Che microstructure of the market or the trading
procedures and practices. For example, a recent study, Amihud and
Mendelson (1987), examines the effects of the mechanism by which
securities are traded on their price behavior: the dealership market
versus the clearing house. Acknowledging that the opening transac-
tions in the New York Stock Exchange represent the outcome of a call
auction trading procedure, whereas trading at the close is carried out
at prices that are set or affected by the exchange's market-makers,
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) compares the volatility of the opening
prices with that of the closing prices, using the 30 NYSE stocks which
constituted the Dow Jones Industrial Index for February 8, 1982, to
February 18, 1983. The empirical results show that the volatility is
much higher at the opening than at the closing. Based upon the
results, they argue that the variance is higher in a clearing house
compared to the dealership market.
In light of the results, on one hand, one may expect a higher
volatility in the futures market than in the spot market since the
former is characterized by the clearing open outcry auction while the
latter is basically a dealership market, even though there are some
factors unique to each market. This logic might have led to the
conclusions of the numerous studies after the "crash of October 1987"
-2-
by the SEC report, the Presidential Task Force (Brady), General Ac-
counting Office, and the Joint Task Force (Treasury, Federal Reserves,
SEC and CFTC). All of these studies have a common theme of using
circuit breakers or trading halt to control the market volatility.
However, a thorough examination of investors behavior for the given
trading mechanism of the markets seems to be a natural step before we
impose any change or further regulation on the raicrostructure of the
market. On the other hand, one should not expect different volatili-
ties between opening and closing times in the futures market since it
is a clearing auction market from the opening to the closing.
The purpose of this study is multi-fold. First, we compare the
volatility of spot prices with that of futures prices to test the
implications of different trading mechanisms for the volatility of
prices. Initially, following previous studies, a conventional estima-
tor of the volatility is used which is the variance of the changes in
observed prices over fixed time intervals (e.g. , see Amihud and
Mendelson (1987), Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988) and MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988)). We will call this conven-
tional measure of volatility hereafter the natural volatility, follow-
ing Cho and Frees (1988). Using intraday data, we estimate the
volatilities of prices from closing to closing, from opening to
opening, and for 30 minute intervals during the day. Second, in an
attempt to explain the observed patterns of the volatility during the
day, we develop a simple theoretical equilibrium model for security
prices when investors trade the securities for short-term speculative
profits based on their imperfect or heterogeneous information, and
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derive some implications of the model for the price volatility during
the day, in particular, around the opening time. Since the model uti-
lizes speculators' behavior for short-term profits, it is particularly
useful to explain the volatility patterns during the trading and
nontrading hours during the day. Third, to provide further insights
into the volatility of spot and futures prices, we adopt a temporal
estimator of volatility, developed by a recent study, Cho and Frees
(1988), which examines the time required for the prices to move beyond
a given unit price interval using the concept of the so-called first
passage time. The temporal estimator would be particularly useful
when the intraday data is used.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II compares the vola-
tilities of spot and futures prices using the natural estimator and
discusses some policy implications. Section III develops a theoreti-
cal model for security prices when investors trade the securities
based on their heterogeneous information, and provides partial answers
for the observed volatility patterns. Section IV provides the results
of the temporal estimator of volatility. Concluding remarks are con-
tained in Section V.
II. Volatilities of Spot and Futures Prices
A. Data
This paper used all intraday spot and futures prices of the Major
Market Index (MMI) over the period July 23, 1984 to July 15, 1986.
The MMI is a price-weighted index of 20 blue-chip stocks, including 15
of the 30 Dow Jones industrials. The data base includes every trans-
action as reported for the futures contract and the values of the spot
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index occurring one to four times every minute of the trading day, so
that a percentage change is available for each minute of trading at
minimum. For futures prices, the most actively traded MMI futures
contracts were used. In general, the most actively traded futures
contract was the nearby contract except for the delivery month when
the next contract became most actively traded. Also, following
Cornell (1985), all holidays and the days following holidays were
excluded from the sample. For the sample period, there were 16 holi-
days, six on Monday, two on Tuesday, two on Wednesday, three on
Thursday and three on Friday. MMI futures contracts were traded be-
tween 8:45 a.m. and 3:15 p.m. while the MMI stocks were traded between
9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. in Chicago time before October 1, 1985. But
since October 1, 1985, both exchanges have opened 30 minutes earlier.
B. Natural Estimator of Volatility
First, using the natural estimator of volatility, we compared spot
prices with futures prices. Table 1 presents the ratio of the
variance of the open-to-open returns to the variance of the close-to-
close returns. The daily returns were measured by log(P /P
_•)• In
both futures and spot markets, the open-to-open returns appear to be
more volatile than the close-to-close returns. For the spot market,
this result is consistent with Amihud and Mendelson (1987), even
though the magnitude of the ratio of the variances is different from
ours. The average ratio of Var(R )/Var(R ) for 30 stocks in Amihud
and Mendelson (1987) is 1.20. The difference between their results
and ours lies In the fact that they deal with individual stocks
whereas ours is for a portfolio. Based on these results, one may be
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tempted to conclude that the different volatility of prices between
the opening and closing time is due to the different trading proce-
dures, open auction market at the opening versus dealership market at
the closing.
Insert Table 1 about here
However, the results on the futures contract suggest that the
trading mechanism Is not necessarily the reason for the different
volatilities between the opening and closing times. Unlike the spot
market, the futures market is essentially an open outcry auction
market from the opening to the closing. Nevertheless, the opening
prices appear to be more volatile than the closing prices, like the
spot market. Note also that the ratio of the variances in the futures
market is even larger than that in the spot market.
Also, in an attempt to test the possibility of the day of the week
effect, we compared the volatilities of spot and futures prices on
each day of the week. Table 2 presents the results. It appears that
there is no substantial difference of volatility behavior across days
of the week in both spot and futures markets. Also, the opening
prices appear to be more volatile than the closing prices except
Thursday and Friday for spot prices and Thursday for futures prices,
which, in general, confirms our previous results. However, contrary
to the conventional wisdom in the markets, the spot market appears to
be more volatile than the futures market in both opening and closing
prices, with one exception in each category, Friday in the opening
prices and Tuesday in the closing prices.
-6-
Insert Table 2 about here
We also estimated the volatilities of spot and futures prices for
30 minute intervals during the day. Table 3 and Figure 1 present the
results. Although the CBT closed at 3:15 p.m., the last 15 minutes
were discarded to match the spot market's closing time. The intraday
volatility patterns appear to be U-shaped, which is consistent with
previous studies (e.g., Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985)). The volatility
of prices in both spot and futures markets is very high posterior to
the opening time and declines until noon and goes up prior to the
closing time.
Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here
Of particular interest is that futures prices do not appear to be
as volatile as spot prices on average throughout the day. In fact,
spot prices appear to be more volatile than futures prices from the
opening to around noon. As pointed out by MacKinlay and Ramaswamy
(1988), if arbitrageurs maintain the link between the two markets, the
variances of spot and futures prices should be equal. Note, also that
trading of the MMI stocks are not necessarily synchronous. If .some of
the stocks were not traded for a short period of time, the volatility
of the Index was likely to be lower than the case where all of the
stocks were traded simultaneously. Thus, the volatility of the index
reported here would be a conservative measure. The results in sum
suggest that the different volatilities during the day are not
necessarily due to the different trading mechanism.
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The results in this section have some important implications for
regulating the futures market. Since the inception of stock index
futures in the early 1980s, the headlines of financial media have
often singled out the stock-index futures contracts as the villains,
when the stock market experienced unusually volatile swings in prices,
rather than attributing the volatility to the fundamental factors that
influence the market. A good example is the market crash on
October 19, 1987, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged by
more than 500 points. While the causes for the crash are still con-
troversial, the majority of people in the Wall Street as well as regu-
lators have blamed speculative behavior of investors in the futures
market. As a result, a number of proposals have been suggested to
impose some curbs on trading the stock index futures contracts such as
circuit breaker system (e.g., Brady's report (1988) and the Joint Task
2
Force report (1988)). The bottom line of such a proposal is that
futures prices are too volatile. However, the results in this section
lead us to believe the necessity of reconsidering the proposal.
Also, the analogy that the various reports use for the justifica-
tion of circuit breakers is misleading. They state that if a machine
or some other mechanical man made operation is going to get out of
control, the best way to keep it under control is to "pull the plug."
This may work very well for controlling machines because the machine
cannot anticipate the plug being pulled. Whereas financial markets
are able to anticipate trading halts or market closure. In fact, the
existence of the closing of trading may cause increases in volatility
because market participants may want to get their trade complete
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before Che trading is halted, thereby if participants anticipate a
trading halt they may increase the level of trading to beat the clo-
sure of the market. The increased volatility prior to the closing
time we observed in this section may confirm those activities of
investors. We now show in the next section that the intraday vola-
tilities we have observed may be attributable, at least in part, to
speculative behavior of investors who trade the securities for short-
term speculative profits based on their heterogeneous information.
III. A Model for Speculative Prices
In this section, we attempt to show, in a simple market setting,
that the high volatility around the opening time and the decrease of
the volatility posterior to the opening time in both markets may be
attributable to speculative behavior of investors based on heteroge-
nous information that is created in nontrading hours.
Let us consider a simplified world in which there are large but
equal number N of buyers and sellers. Prior to a release of new
information, investors will have the incentive to privately learn
about the nature of forthcoming information. Unless private infor-
mation is perfect across all investors, they will trade securities
based on their private (heterogeneous) information and thus new in-
formation may be reflected in security prices prior to Its public
release. If new information is publicly released at discrete points
in time, investors may speculate between consecutive time points of
public information. However, as the time until public information
approaches zero, investors' expectations will be more homogeneous and,
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therefore, speculative opportunities will disappear with the disclo-
sure of public information.
Denote buyers' and sellers' expected security prices by v and v,
respectively, where v > y_. In addition, let us assume that buyers'
and sellers' preferences are characterized by the following short-term
trading profit functions, respectively:
u. = v - c for buyer
1
(1)
u» d - y_ for seller,
where c is the striking price plus trading cost (for buyer) and d
3
represents the striking price less trading cost (for seller). For
analytic convenience, each buyer and seller is assumed to trade
exactly one share of the security if and only if his or her expected
profit is non-negative (i.e.
,
Eu .> and Eu >_ 0). Buyers are
indexed by the trading cost s, where k(s) = l/a(v - y_) is the probabi-
lity density of s with support o < s <_ a(v - v_) and a is a positive
constant. On the other hand, sellers are indexed by the trading cost
t, where £(t) = l/a(v - y_) is the probability density of t with sup-
port o < t
_< a(v - y_). Thus, Nk(s) and N£(t) represent the number of
buyers of type s and the number of sellers of type t, respectively,
and the trading costs are smaller if and only if buyers' and sellers'
expectations are more homogeneous. Note that buyers and sellers are
identically distributed with respect to their trading costs. Since
buyers in one period may become sellers in another period and vice
versa, the identical distribution assumption appears reasonable.
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Assume that buyers (sellers) know the probability distribution of
the security prices x (y) that sellers (buyers) are willing to sell
(pay) for. Denote by F(x) and G(y) the probability distribution func-
tions of x and y with support x_ j< x <^ x and x^ _< y _< x for buyers and
4
sellers, respectively.
Then, the optimal buyer behavior can be described as follows.
Consider a buyer of type s, and suppose that Q is the smallest of the
x values that he/she has observed. If an additional seller is ran-
domly sampled, the gross increase of his/her expected profit is
Q Q
<KQ) = / (Q-x)dF(x) = / F(x)dx. (2)
2L 2L
Since the additional sample costs s, the buyer will keep trying to get
more information until x <_ Q(s), where the critical value of Q(s) is
determined by the marginality condition
s = <KQ(s)). (3)
Since 4»(Q) is increasing:
4>'(Q) = F(Q) > (4)
for all Q > x.> buyers are likely to search more information in the
average if and only if the costs are smaller.
Following the same logic, the optimal strategy of a seller of type
t can be described as: keep trying if an x < R(t) is observed; and
trade with the buyer if he/she is willing to pay an x >_ R(t), where
the threshold R(t) solves
-1 1-
X
t = / [y - R(t)]dG(y) (5)
R(t)
for all < t < a(v - v). Define
x x
1»(R) = / [y-R]dG(y) = / [1-G(y)]dy (6)
R R
for all x < R <_ x. Then, the above condition can be written as
t = <|>(R(t)) (7)
for all t. Since 4>(R) is decreasing:
4f»(R) - -[l-G(R)] < (8)
for all R < x, sellers are likely to search more information in the
average if and only if the costs are smaller.
Theorem 1 . If a market equilibrium exists, and it is characterized
by distribution functions F(x) and G(x) with support x < x < x, the
following must then hold (see Appendix A for proof).
(a) v_
_< x^ < x ^ v;
x
(b) / F(x)dx <_ a(v-v);
x
(c) / [1 - G(x)]dx <_ a(v-v);
x
(d) {/ [1 - G(y)]dy} • F'(x) = 1 - G(x);
x
-12-
x
(e) {/ F(y)dy} • G'(x) = F(x);
x
for all x < x < x.
Theorem 2 . If the trading cost parameter a is not too large (Tta < 2),
then market equilibrium exists and is characterized by the following
(see Appendix B for proof):
(a) F(x) = sin r(x - x.)
;
(b) G(x) = 1 - cos r(x - x.)
;
(c) x - x - 27;
for all _x <^ x _< x, where
llliilf * Min{(2-ir+7ra)v + (2-Tfa)v, (4-ir) [ (l-a)v + av_] } (9)
and
(l-a)v + a7 - x
_< ^ < -^ • Min{(l-a)7 + a v - x , -^ a(v~-v)} (10)
The following implications are immediate from Theorems 1 and 2:
i) The price dispersion (x - x) is larger if either trading costs are
larger (i.e., a i9 larger) or traders' expectations get more hetero-
geneous (i.e., v - y_ gets larger); ii) The price dispersion is posi-
tively related to the trading cost parameter (a(v - v))«
Volatility of Prices Posterior to Opening
We have shown that equilibrium prices prior to disclosure of
public information (let us call it the "speculative price" as opposed
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to Che "normal price" subsequent to public information) critically
depends on speculators' behavior due to heterogeneous information. In
order to examine the volatility of speculative prices relative to that
of normal prices, let us consider an arbitrary but fixed period from
the opening time t = to time t = 1. For analytic tractability
,
we assume that the relevant state for the period is realized at t = 0,
but that the state information is to be made public at T = 1. Denote
by v the equilibrium stock price that is to be realized subsequent to
public information at t =1.
Consider the speculative market at time x (0 < T < 1). Since the
price v is not likely to be known to investors at the time t, some
investors' estimates of v may be larger than others' unless private
information is homogeneous. Denote by v_(t ) and v(t ) speculative sel-
lers' and buyers' estimates of v at time x < 1, respectively. The
speculation market is then active at t if and only if y_(t ) < v(t).
In order to avoid indeterminate striking prices for speculative
trading, let us assume that speculative sellers are Stackelberg
leaders: a seller of type t sets his/her selling price at the indi-
vidual reservation price R(t) and waits until a buyer who is willing
to pay the price arrives. Given this assumption, the speculative
price or actual striking price x is distributed by F(x|t) at time t,
and thus its mean can be written as
E(x|t)-J x dF(x|r) =» x(t) +-7-7 <7 " 1) <11)
x(t) nT ; l
where the quantities x_(t ) and r(x ) satisfy (9) and (10).
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Let us define
b(t) = E(x|t) - v and z(x) = x(x ) - E(x|x) (12)
for < t < 1. The quantity b(x) measures the deviation of the
average speculative price from the price subsequent to public infor-
mation at the opening time. We shall call b(x ) speculators' average
bias . Depending upon the reliability of their private information,
speculators may be biased positively (b(x) >_ 0) or negatively (b(x) <_
0). On the other hand, the variable z(t) measures the deviation of an
actual striking price from its mean. We shall call z(x) speculators
'
trading risk component . Note that the trading risk z(t) is "small" if
and only if the price dispersion x(x ) - x_("0 of speculative prices
x(t) is small.
Then, the speculative price x(x ) at time x (0 < t < 1) can be
written as:
x(x) = v + b(x) + z(x). (13)
Furthermore, the trading risk z(x) can be characterized by
E[z(x)] - and Var[z(x)] = - " 3 (14)
[r(x)p
where
< 7^-yi a[7(x) - v(x)]. (15)
Equation (13) implies that speculators are exposed to three risks:
the volatility of the normal price v (i.e., the intrinsic risk of the
security); the risk due to errors of heterogeneous information (b(x));
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and the trading risk of speculators (z(t)). If the relevant state of
the firm for the time period < t < 1 is realized at t =0, the
intrinsic risk component v is not variable during < x < 1. Never-
theless, the variance of the speculative price x(t ) can be positive
due to the bias b(t ) and the trading risk z(t).
As a result, the speculative price would be more volatile than the
normal price subsequent to disclosure of public information. In other
words, the volatility decreases posterior to disclosure of public
information after the market opens. In practice, the precise time
when public information becomes available is extremely difficult to
determine from the time of the day trading takes place. However,
judging from the intraday patterns of the volatility in the previous
section, the heterogeneous information created in nontrading hours
seems to affect the price around the opening time and it seems to take
about 30-45 minutes for the market to reach the normal price.
IV. Temporal Estimator of Volatility
In the previous sections, we have shown that the volatility of
prices around the opening time is high relative to other times and, in
general, it is U-shaped during the day, and that spot prices appear to
be more volatile than futures prices unlike the conventional wisdom.
Also, we have shown that the speculative behavior of investors based
on heterogenous information created during the nontrading hours might
provide at least partial answers to the high volatility of prices
around the opening time. However, the question is yet to be answered
why futures prices have been acknowledged, in general, as more vola-
tile than spot prices if the variance of futures prices is lower than
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that of spot prices as we observed In the previous section. We may
find one possible reason in different speed of information adjustment
in different markets due to some reasons such as different transaction
costs.
Cho and Frees (1988) proposes a temporal estimator of stock price
volatility as an alternative to the natural estimator . The estimator
comes from the notion of how quickly the price changes rather than how
much the price changes. In other works, the more volatile stock price
should move quicker, and hence the so-called first passage time should
be shorter than the less volatile stock. While the natural estimator
focuses on how much the price changes during a given unit time inter-
val, the temporal estimator focuses on how quickly the price moves
beyond a given unit price level. It is shown that the temporal esti-
mator has desirable asymptotic properties, including consistency and
asymptotic normality. The brief outline of the temporal estimator is
as follows.
Assume that, the true stock prices are log-normally distributed and
the observed stock prices are continuously monitored. That is, the
true stock price is assumed to be P(t) - P(0)exp(oB(t ) + ut), t
_> 0.
Here P(0) is a known constant, u and a are unknown parameters, and
(B(t); t
_> 0} is standard Brownian Motion over [0, 00 ]. The observed
stock price is assumed to be P(t) = [P(t)/d] • d, where d is a known
constant. For example, d = 1/8 on the New York Stock Exchange.
Based on the notion of the first passage time and these assump-
tions, they construct a consistent estimator along with its asymptotic
sampling distribution. First, they define the sequence of stopping
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time random variables It 1 , by t = (first time t > t such that
L
n' n=l n l n-1
P(t)/P(t .) < [(1+d)" 1
,
(1+d)]}, where x n = 0. Thus, {At }, wheren—
1
' U n'
At = t , - t , is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables,
n n+1 n
Besides, they introduce two functions: g,(x) = |l+(l+d) } and
g 2
(x) = log(l+d)(2g
1
(x)-L). Applying Theorem 3.6 of Siegmund (1985),
they derive some important relationships between the parameters, U and
a, and the expected time between price changes, Et . That is, if
u * 0, then Pr{P(T) = 1 + d} = p = g^u/a 2 ) and Et = u" l g 2 (2u /a
2
).
The temporal estimator is suggested then as
a
2
= 2W
2
/g
2
1(
^2~n )
= 2i
2
/g~ 1 [n'HogPt^) ]
,
(16)
where
u , - t log[P(x )]
L n n
t = t /n.
n
Their simulation study shows that measurement errors in the time
of price changes are more likely to induce less biases than measure-
ment errors in the magnitude of price changes. It is also shown that
the natural estimator does not become better as one adds more obser-
vations per day.
The temporal estimator is particularly useful in this study since
we use intraday transaction data. We measured the temporal estimators
of volatility for both spot and futures prices for d 1/8 using Eq.
(16). Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 represent daily temporal volatilities of
spot and futures prices, for July 23, 1984 - December, 1984, January,
-18-
1985 - June, 1985, July 1985 - December, 1985, January, 1986 -
July 15, 1986, respectively.
Insert Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 about bere
Table 4 and Figure 6 show the results on the temporal estimators
of volatility of both spot and futures prices for 30 minute intervals
during the day. In contrast to the results of the natural estimator,
futures prices appear to be more volatile than spot prices, and any
systematic pattern of the volatility does not seem to exist during the
day. It is also clear that the futures price moves more quickly than
the spot price to reach a given unit price level. Thus, as pointed
out earlier, information adjustment in the futures market seems to be
faster than in the spot market, which may be due to lower transaction
costs in the futures market. This may be able to explain why the
futures price has been conceived by the market participants to be more
volatile than the spot price.
Insert Table 4 and Figure 6 about here
Summing up the results of natural and temporal estimates of vola-
tility, we can imagine the following patterns of spot and futures
prices over time.
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 . .
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It is obvious that if we use the natural estimator of volatility,
the series A is more volatile than the series B. On the other hand,
if we use the temporal estimator, the series B is more volatile than
the series A. Assuming that the unit time is 30 minutes, it is con-
ceivable that the series A and B correspond to the spot and futures
prices, respectively, i.e., the futures price is more (less) volatile
than the spot price in terms of the temporal (natural) estimator.
V. Conclusion
It has been generally well-known that opening prices are more
volatile than closing prices in the stock market, and that the intra-
day volatility pattern is U-shaped. The different volatilities around
the opening and closing times have often been attributed to the dif-
ferent trading mechanisms by which the prices are determined: the
opening transactions in the NYSE represent the outcome of an auction
trading procedure, whereas closing prices are determined by the
market -makers.
This paper investigates the volatilities of spot and futures
prices in an attempt to compare the two different trading mechanisms:
the futures market is characterized by the clearing open outcry auc-
tion from the opening to the closing while the stock market is basi-
cally a dealership market except the opening time. One might expect
higher volatility in futures prices than in spot prices and should not
expect different volatilities between opening and closing times in the
futures market if the different volatility behavior between the opening
and the closing is solely due to different trading mechanisms. In
-20-
fact, it has been a conventional wisdom that futures prices are more
volatile than spot prices, and thus more severe restrictions should be
imposed on futures trading. Using the intraday data of the Major
Market Index and its future prices, this paper shows that the volatil-
ity of opening prices is higher than that of closing prices not only
in the spot market but in the futures market, and that the intraday
volatility patterns are U-shaped in both markets. Of particular
interest is that futures prices do not appear to be as volatile as
spot prices when the natural estimator of volatility is used, which is
not consistent with the conventional wisdom. Thus, we argue that the
different volatility patterns during the day are not necessarily due
to the different trading mechanisms, auction market versus dealership
market. Instead, we show that the different volatilities during the
day, at least in part, may be attributable to speculative behavior of
investors based on heterogeneous information.
In addition, we further investigate the volatilities of spot and
futures prices using the temporal estimator of price volatility, pro-
posed by Cho and Frees (1988) as an alternative to the natural estima-
tor. When the temporal estimator is adopted, we are not able to find
any systematic pattern of volatilities during the day in both spot and
futures markets, and futures prices appear, in general, to be more
volatile than spot prices. Based on these results of natural and
temporal estimators of price volatility, we argue that futures prices
may be said to be more volatile than spot prices in terms of how
quickly the price moves beyond a given unit price level, but not in
terms of how much the price changes during a given unit time interval.
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This paper has some important policy implications. For example,
Che common idea of using circuit breakers recommended by the various
reports after the Market Crash in October 1987 should be reconsidered.
The lower natural variance and higher temporal variance of futures
prices than spot prices suggest that information may be more quickly
reflected in prices in the futures market than in the spot market but
the absolute changes of futures prices during a given unit time inter-
val are on average lower than those of spot prices. This result is
consistent with the view that the futures market can play a positive
economic role. Besides, the increased volatility prior to Che closing
of the markets suggests that trading halts or market closure may cause
increases in volatility rather than decreases. A further investiga-
tion of trading mechanism is certainly needed before such regulation
as circuit breakers is imposed on futures trading. In particular, the
question of how much and in what direction the volatility of futures
prices leads to the volatility of spot prices deserves a further study.
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FOOTNOTES
We also estimated the volatilities for 30 minute intervals for
each day of the week. Since the results are not different depending
on the day of the week, they are not reported in the paper. However,
they are available from the authors upon request.
2
Other proposals include tightening the price limits of futures
prices, increasing margin requirements, and using the opening price as
the settlement price.
3
The trading cost is a general term that includes transaction
costs and the cost involved in acquiring information and searching the
best striking price.
4
Note that since buyers and sellers are to be matched on a one-to-
one basis, both x and y values must have the same support.
This assumption is just for simplicity. We may assume alterna-
tively that speculative buyers are Stackelberg leaders. Since the
equilibrium speculative price must be distributed between the two
distribution functions F(x) and G(x), all of the results should be
intact with only minor changes even when neither buyers nor sellers
are Stackelberg leaders.
6
From (12), x(x ) - v + [E(x|x - v] + [x(t) - E(x|t)]. Thus (13)
X
2 2
is obvious. In addition, Var[z(x)] =» Var[x(x)] / x dF(x|x) - E(x|x) ,
x_
where F(x|x) = sin[ r(x )(x-x_(x ) ] for x.( T ) _< x <, x(x ) from Theorem 2,
2
and E(x|x) is given by (11). Therefore, Var[z(x)] = (tt— 3 ) / [r(x ) ] can
be easily derived.
-23-
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Table 1
Comparison of Volatility of Open-to-Open
Returns and Close-to-Close Returns*
Var(R
Q )
Var(R )
c
Min(R
Q )
Min(R )
c
Max(R
Q )
Max(R )
c
MMI
(Futures)
1.0967 1.076 0.92059
MMI
(Spot)
1.0384 1.0 0.96237
*Var(RQ) and Var(Rc ) are the variances of the open-to-open returns and
the close-to-close returns, respectively. The return is measured by
log (Pt/Pt-l); Min and Max represent the minimum and maximum returns,
respectively.
Table 2
Comparison of Volatilities Between
Spot and Futures Markets for Each Day of the Week*
(July 23, 1984 - July 15, 1986)
Var(O-S)
Var(C-S)
Var(O-F)
Var(C-F)
Var(O-S)
Var(O-F)
Var(C-S)
Var(C-F)
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
1.047961
1.170940
1.122372
0.916231
0.900601
1.009623
1.174713
1.127335
0.938465
1.069829
1.076383
1.143622
1.033475
1.046324
0.891513
1.029007
0.999704
1.071018
1.041716
1.042032
Average 1.031891 1.081314 1.038263 1.03270
*Var(0-S) and Var(C-S) represents the variance of weekly open-to-open
returns and close-to-close returns In the spot market. Var(O-F) and
Var(C-F) are the counterparts in the futures market.
Table 3
a
Natural Estimator of Intraday Volatility
Time Observation
- 2
a (Spot)
"2
a (Futures)
h -5 -5
8:30 — 9:00 198 1.687 E
-5 0.767 E
9:00 — 9:30 495 1.113 E
-5 0.605 E~
9:30 — 10:00 496 0.392 E
-5 0.283 E -
10:00 — 10:30 496 0.333 E
-
0.266 E
10:30 — 11:00 496 0.325 E
-5 0.285 E"^
11:00 — 11:30 496 0.280 E
-5 0.259 E"^
11:30 — 12:00 496 0.240 E
-
0.241 E"^
12:00 — 12:30 496 0.308 E
-5 0.308 E~^
12:30 - 13:00 496 0.305 E
-5 0.304 E~
13:00 — 13:30 496 0.394 E
-5 0.425 E~^
13:30 — 14:00 496 0.490 E
-5 0.493 E"^
14:00 — 14:30 496 0.841 i? J 0.855 E~l
14:30 — 15:00° 496 0.870 E" 5 0.877 E" 5
The volatility is measured by the variance of log(P t /P t_p and the
unit time interval is 30 minutes. If P^ was not available at exact
time t, the price closest to t was used.
Since the spot market opened at 9:00 in Chicago time before
October 1, 1985, the volatility for 8:30 - 9:00 was estimated using
the data only since October 1, 1985. Also, although the futures
market closed at 3:15 p.m., the futures prices for the last 15
minutes were discarded to match the spot prices.
Table 4
Temporal Estimator of Intraday Volatility
S pot Market Futures Market
TiiBe t_ Min Max of. Min Max
8:30 - 9:00* 0.006830 0.000445 0.342250 0.149058 0.000797 7.771123
9:00 - 9:30 0.012112 0.000486 0.542024 0.019437 0.000668 1.070025
9:30 - 10:00 0.013497 0.000733 0.257501 0.144130 0.000842 11.38132
10:00 - 10:30 0.020661 0.000685 0.524652 0.077486 0.000773 7.747582
10:30 - 11:00 0.020300 0.000751 1.070679 0.137171 0.000902 10.81968
11:00 - 11:30 0.022686 0.000683 0.521450 0.147900 0.000811 10.96116
11:30 - 12:00 0.023127 0.000896 0.785974 0.064182 0.000995 5.683590
12:00 - 12:30 0.021072 0.000890 0.295222 0.058764 0.000807 6.784774
12:30 - 13:00 0.017042 0.000680 0.299914 0.056839 0.000728 7.891387
13:00 - 13:30 0.016385 0.000411 0.416991 0.047883 0.000803 5.171524
13:30 - 14:00 0.011846 0.000497 0.228864 0.064754 0.000653 10.65167
14:00 - 14:30 0.009006 0.000289 0.166973 0.020151 0.000393 1.659474
14:30 - 15:00* 0.009102 0.000456 0.170667 0.033843 0.000426 4.086381
*Since the spot market opened at 9:00 in Chicago time before October 1, 1985,
the volatility for 8:30 - 9:00 was estimated using the data only since October 1,
1985. Also, although the futures market closed at 3:15 p.m., the futures
prices for the last 15 minutes were discarded to match the spot prices.
Figure 1
Intraday Natural Variance
(July 23, 1984 - July 15, 1986)
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Figure 2
Daily Temporal Volatility of Prices
(July 23, 1984 - December 31, 1984)
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Figure 3
Daily Temporal Volatility of Prices
(January, 1985 - June, 1985)
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Figure 4
Daily Temporal Volatility of Prices
(July, 1985 - December, 1985)
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Figure 5
Daily Temporal Volatility of Prices
(January, 1986 - July 15, 1986)
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Figure 6
Intraday Temporal Variance
(July 23, 1984 - July 15, 1986)
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
Result (a) is obvious since buyers' and sellers' expected trading
profits must be non-negative. Turning to result (b), assume that it
does not hold:
x
(Al) a(v - v ) < <fr(x) - / F(x)dx.
x_
Since 4>(Q) is strictly increasing by (4), this implies
(A2) Q[a(7 - v)] < x
(apply the strictly increasing inverse $ (•) of $(•) to (Al) and then
use (3)). It then follows from (A2) that no^ buyers are going to pay
the prices x with Q[a(v - y_)] < x _< x: a contradiction to the fact
that x. <. * <^ x is the support of G(x). In other words, condition (b)
must hold in equilibrium. The proof of result (c) is similar.
Now we consider result (d). Let x be fixed such that x^ < x jC x.
F(x) is generated by the set of the reservation prices R(t) of sellers
of type t with R(t) < x conditional upon the constraint that x < R(t) < x:
F(x) - Prob{R(t) < x|x < R(t) <7}.
Since R(t) < x if and only if t > iKx) by (7) and (8), we have
F(x) . 1 j"
(
-\(t)dt -i-Afsl
{*(x)/[a(v - v)]} J Hx) *(x)
for all _x < x
_< x. Differentiating the above with respect to x and
then using (6) and (8), we can easily obtain (d). Since the proof of
result (e) is similar, this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the system of differential equations:
(Bl) A F'(x) - 1 - G(x) and B G f (x) = F(x)
where
x x
A - / [1 - G(y)]dy and B - / F(y)dy
*. 2L
(cf. (d) and (e) in Theorem 1). Eliminating F(x) from (Bl), we have
(B2) A3 G"(x) + G(x) - 1.
Setting
(B3) r --4=,
/AB
we can write the solution of (B2) in the form:
G(x) 1 - c. cosCrx - c-)
for all x
_< x _< x, where c. and c_ are integration constants. It then
follows from (Bl) that F(x) must have the form:
F(x) - Brc sin(rx - c )
for all x < x < x. Since F(x) - G(x) - 1, we must then have
(B4) Br - 1; rx - c - nw + y; and c - (-l)
n
where n is an integer. Since Br 1, (B3) yields
3-2
(B5) A = B = -.
Since F(x) = G(x) 0, we also have
(B6) rx - c ? = mir ; and n - m = an even integer.
Since F(x)
J>
and G(x)
_< 1 for all x <^ x _< x, however, the quantities
(rx - c_) and (rx - c_) cannot differ by more than y. Thus, n - ra =
and (B6) can be rewritten as
(B6) ' rx - c~ » rnr.
As a result, we can obtain
rx - c
?
» r(x - x.) + (r_x - c~) r(x - x) + m\
and results (a)-(c) thus follow.
Turning to results (9) and (10), note that
(B7) < - < (v-v) • Min[a, -]
r — — 'it
(cf. (a) and (b) in Theorem 1 and result x - x. =—)• Also, observe
that buyers of type s with — < s <_ a(v-y_) and sellers of type t with
— < t <_ a(v-y_) search the market only once since
x x
/ xdF(x) - x - -, and / ydG(y) - x + k
x_
In view of the facts that
x
it
, aEu.(s) v - s - / xdF(x) =» v - 3 ~x.~(y~ l)-
X_
for all — < s <_ a(v-v_), and that Eu-(s) >^ 0, we must have
B-3
(B8) (j - l)i < v - a(v-v) - x - (l-a)v + a v - x
.
Similarly, we obtain from Eu
2
(t)
_> for t a(v-v) that
(B9) - > <w + (l-a)v - x.
In other words, we must determine endogenously the quantities r and x.
such that conditions (B7), (B8) and (B9) are satisfied. While
tedious, it is not difficult to show that results (9) and (10) follow
from (B7), (B8) and (B9). The proof of Theorem 2 is herewith
completed.
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